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This paper analyses a two-echelon supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer. The market
demand is assumed to be uncertain and considered to be retail price dependent and dependent on the
supplier's service level and on the retailer's promotional effort. The unsold items at the retailer are
repurchased by the supplier at a price less than the sales prices. Conversely, the retailer encounters
shortages because the demand is naturally uncertain. The optimal order quantity, selling price, pro-
motional effort and service level are evaluated analytically as well as numerically for single period news-
vendor-type demand patterns. The proﬁt functions of the supplier and the retailer are analysed and
compared in accordance with Stakelberg and integrated approaches. Computational results show that an
integrated system is always beneﬁcial for the members of the chain.
Copyright © 2016, Far Eastern Federal University, Kangnam University, Dalian University of Technology,
Kokushikan University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The objective of supply chain management is to generally target
performance enhancement by either reducing costs or escalating
proﬁts. There are vast methods of doing either; therefore, the most
effective means of proﬁt enhancement is boosting market demand
by various means. Given today's furiously competitive market
scenario, the foremost objective of an efﬁcient supply chain man-
ager is to consider all of the issues pertaining to demand
enhancement. The concernedmanagementmust address the issues
that affect the market demand and outline the strategies of the
chain accordingly. The very ﬁrst step is to identify the most sensi-
tive factors that improvise market demand. Of all such factors, the
product's retail price is the most important factor that affects de-
mand. Usually the demand decreases with the retail price incre-
ment. In addition to the retail price, the market demand depends
on certain non-price factors such as the quality of the product, the
brand value, and the availability in the market. There are few fac-
tors other than these non-price factors that positively improve the).
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ersity, Kangnam University, Dalian
C-ND license (http://creativecommproduct's demand. For example, different types of promotional
activities adopted by supply chain members are to enhance the
demand of the commodity. Such activities include advertisements,
free gifts, delays in payment, and discount offers. If a huge number
of consumers become knowledgeable regarding the salient
attractive features and usefulness of the product through promo-
tional activities, the demand for the product will improve. Another
fruitful means to enhance demand is furnishing after-sales service.
Bestowing before and after-sale servicing such as bestowing free
servicing and repairing through a stipulated time period or facili-
tating replacement of the product if damaged or underperforming
are generally very helpful to capturing a wide range of customers.
Very often, providing a high service level or investing greatly in
promotional activities is very costly and may cause high expendi-
ture levels. Therefore, chain members must invest in an optimal
desired effort level to increase potential customers. In both in-
ventory and supply chain literature, researchers have determined
sales effort as a factor that increases demand in a single retailer
scenario as well as a tool that beneﬁts the retailer in capturingmore
of the total market demand.
In recent decades, there has been extensive research regarding
different forms of demands having price dependency; for example,
Wee (1997), Qin et al. (2007) and Ghosh et al. (2011) considered
linear price dependent demand, and Ouyang et al. (2008) and ZiaeeUniversity of Technology, Kokushikan University. Production and hosting by Elsevier
ons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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pendency. Huang and Li (2001), Huang et al. (2002) and Li et al.
(2002) studied the role of vertical co-op advertising efﬁciency
with respect to dealings between a manufacturer and a retailer
through brand names. Bernstein and Federgruen (2007) examined
coordinationmechanisms for supply chains under price and service
competition. Lau and Lau (2003) explicitly studied the effect of
different demand patterns on the optimal decisions of a multi-
echelon supply chain. Panda (2011) addressed an optimal pricing
and replenishment policy in a declining price sensitive environ-
ment under continuous unit cost decreases. Panda et al. (2012)
studied the problem of optimal pricing and economic order quan-
tity in a stock and price sensitive demand environment. Javid and
Hoseinpour (2011) investigated the coordination of co-op adver-
tising decisions in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one
retailer. Wang et al. (2011) coordinated co-op advertising models
with one manufacturer and two competitive retailers. Recently,
Javid and Hoseinpour (2012) re-addressed the static, single-period
co-op advertising model that was introduced and studied earlier by
Huang and Li (2001) and subsequently by several other authors
using game theory.
Despite the fact that sales efforts are utilised in the real world
to promote huge sales, the quantity of effort and money expended
on providing after-sale service and the impact of this usually differ
from product to product. It is generally observed that the effort
level usually varies with the price of the product. If the selling
price is higher, higher sales effort and facilities offered after sales
associated with the product are needed. Therefore, the resulting
effect of providing sales efforts to a particular product on the
proﬁts earned from selling the product by channel partners must
be examined before deciding whether to provide such a facility to
end customers. The effect also depends on the company's reli-
ability and brand value; these play vital roles to control and
determine the effect of such efforts on demand. Remembering the
previously noted facts, a signiﬁcant quantity of research has been
performed in recent years on how the sales effort affects the
market demand; the research also includes how to exert such
effort efﬁciently. Jorgensen et al. (2000, 2001, 2003) and Jorgensen
and Zaccour (2003) extensively studied the long-term multi-
period co-op advertising relation between a manufacturer and a
retailer through dynamic models. Krishnan et al. (2004) showed
that buy-backs with promotional cost-sharing agreements can be
coordinated. Service as well as promotion thus affect both con-
sumer demand and the retailer's sales motivation. Several authors
have established that certain main results and conclusions in the
supply chain analysis may be affected by the choice of the demand
model; in addition, the results are sensitive (Jeuland and Shugan,
1988; Granot and Yin, 2007). Roy and Chaudhuri (2010) analysed a
model of perishable items with time and price dependent demand
considering the time value of money. Recently, the EOQ (economic
order quantity) and the EPQ (economic production quantity)
model for price and promotional effort sensitive demand have
been studied extensively by Taleizadeh et al. (2015a, 2015b),
Cardenas-Barron and Sana (2014, 2015) and Cardenas-Barron
et al. (2014). Modak et al. (2015) introduced corporate social re-
sponsibility in a two-echelon dual-channel supply chain model in
which the coordination of all unit quantity discounts using a
franchise fee agreement and dividing the surplus proﬁt through
bargaining are discussed analytically.
This paper studies the effect of promotional effort and after-
sales service level on demand uncertainty, within a two-echelon
single-period NV (newsvendor) environment using the pricing
strategies of a proﬁt maximizing supplier/retailer. According to the
author's best knowledge, no one has yet used promotional efforts
coupled with before/after-sales service efforts as a tool forenhancing the demand while simultaneously using buy-back con-
tracts for supply chain coordination. Most cited papers solely
consider the effect of price. It is also observed that the demand is
not only dependent on the product's price but also on the manu-
facturer's effort. To develop the market, the supplier/agent applies
selling efforts for the product such as stipulation of the product
information in the market, advertisements, expenditures on social
activities, greening efforts, free repair or after-sales service; these
are very common in practice. Coexistence of the above factors is
common in most retail sectors as strong efforts to improve market
demand. From the above literature, the consequence of promo-
tional effort on supply chain coordination as well as the inﬂuence of
supplier's extra marketing efforts are ignored, particularly in the
NV environment area in which the demand is stochastic in nature.
The literature on the NV is very voluminous and well known in
terms of applicability. Excellent summaries on the subject appear in
Petruzzi and Dada (1999), Silver et al. (1998), Khouja (1999), Chan
et al. (2004), and Lau and Lau (2001). A primary difﬁculty in this
type of research is the problem of designing contracts that will be
rendered beneﬁcial to the various members of the chain. The main
objective of the classical newsboy problem is to maximize the ex-
pected proﬁt. Many other approaches have also been included in
the classical newsboy problem, for example, the mathematical
programming approach was used to ﬁnd the solution. Wang (2010)
studied a game theoretic approach includingmultiple newsvendors
with loss aversion preferences that were competing for inventory
from a risk-neutral supplier. Ozler et al. (2009) proposed the multi-
product newsboy problem under a Value at Risk (VaR) constraint.
Soni and Shah (2011) studied an EPQ model for deterministic,
stochastic or fuzzy demand to minimize the cost function.
Cardenas-Barron et al. (2012) proposed a heuristic algorithm to
determine an optimal solution of the vendor management in-
ventory system with a multi-product and a multi-constraint based
on EOQwith backorders considering two classical backorders costs:
linear and ﬁxed. In newsvendor modelling, the noteworthy works
of Lau and Lau (1988), Wu et al. (2007), Taleizadeh et al. (2012), and
Sana (2011, 2012) should be noted.
In our model, we develop a two-layer supply chain consisting
of one supplier and one retailer. The demand of the end cus-
tomers is stochastic because the arrival of the customers is not
certain in practice. The demand function here has been consid-
ered as a function depending on three prime factors: price, pro-
motional effort as well as sales service efforts. We have
considered the linear demand function case. Because the demand
is uncertain, the retailer may overstock or understock the prod-
ucts. Because of overstocking, the unsold items are returned to
the supplier at a lower price than the supplier's wholesale price,
whereas the retailers must bear the penalty cost for under-
stocking. We have developed the proﬁt functions for the supplier
and the retailer while maintaining the price-promotional effort
and sales service effort-dependent demand in the account. These
supplier and retailer proﬁts are formulated and optimized by
utilizing Stakelberg and integrated approaches. We have also
conducted a comparative study among the above approaches,
which ultimately suggests that the integrated system provides
the best proﬁt.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
explains the fundamental notations and assumptions, Section 3
provides mathematical formulations and an analysis of the
model, and in Section 4, we discuss numerical examples. Section 5
presents a conclusion regarding this paper's ﬁndings.
2. Fundamental assumptions and notation
The following assumptions are made to develop the model:
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(i) The model is developed for a single item.
(ii) The model is associated with a two-echelon supply chain
composed of one supplier and one retailer.
(iii) The Demand rate of the members of the chain is assumed to
be uncertain and price, promotional effort and service level
sensitive.
(iv) The chain uses a buy-back policy.
(v) The lead time is negligible.
(vi) Shortages at the retailers are permitted.
(vii) The replenishment rate is instantaneously inﬁnite; however,
its size is ﬁnite.
Notation
Q e Retailer's Order Quantity.
x e A part of demand quantity (units/month) during a period,
which is a random variable that follows a probability
distribution.
f(x) e Probability density distribution function of x.
F(x) e Cumulative distribution function of x.
F1(x) e Inverse function of F.
p e Unit retail price ($/unit) for retailer.
D(p,s,u) e Demand (units/month), which is a function of the
retail price and the service level. This is provided by the supplier
and the advertising expenditure of the retailer.
s e Service level bore by the supplier for the end customer.
w e Selling price ($/unit) per unit of the supplier to the retailer
(unit purchasing cost of products at the retailer).
v1 e Unit salvage value/return price ($/unit) under a buy-back
contract of unsold goods of the retailer provided by the supplier.
v2 e Unit salvage value/return price ($/unit) of the returned
items of the retailer at the supplier by selling to others.
c e Purchasing cost/production cost ($/unit) of the supplier.
r e Shortage cost ($/unit) of the retailer.
u e Retailer's promotional effort.
b e Denotes the demand sensitivity of the retailer on its own
sales price p.
g e Denotes the demand sensitivity of the retailer on the sup-
plier's service level.
d e Denotes the demand sensitivity of the retailer on its pro-
motional effort.
m e Denotes the mean demand of the retailer.
t1 e Denotes the fraction of expenditure incurred for service
facilities shared by the supplier.
t2 e Denotes the fraction of expenditure incurred for the pro-
motional effort shared by the supplier.
E(S) e Expected proﬁt ($/month) function of the supplier.
E(R) e Expected proﬁt ($/month) function of the retailer.
EIP e Expected integrated proﬁt ($/month) of the chain.
xþ e Max[x,0], the positive part of x.3. Mathematical formulation and analysis of the model
We consider a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a single
supplier and single retailer. The supplier supplies solely to a single
downstream retailer. The end consumers' perception of value and
their purchase decisions are not only inﬂuenced exclusively by the
item's selling price but also by the service level and promotional
efforts that accompany it. Here, service is deemed to broadly
represent all forms of the demand-enhancing effort, including
customer service before and after the sale, in-store promotions, and
advertising and warranty offerings. Many such services can beprovided either by the supplier, or they can be delegated to the
dealer. The supplier and the manufacturer share the cost invested
in service facilities and promotional efforts. In a decentralised
system, the supplier that can observe the retailer's decisions pos-
sesses an advantageous position; however, he cannot control what
the retailer chooses to do. The retailer makes his/her own decisions
independently. Similarly, the supplier may decide on the service
level, the order quantity and the promotional effort independently,
and the retailer then makes the optimal decision regarding the
selling price of the products. However, in an integrated/collabo-
rating system, the supplier and the retailer make decisions jointly.
In this paper, the demand is assumed to be the function of retail
price p and promotional effort u provided by the retailer and the
service level s of the supplier. The functional form of demand is
Dðp; s;uÞ ¼ x bpþ gsþ d (1)
Here, the demand function is decreasing in its own retail price,
increasing in the service level of the supplier and increasing in the
promotional effort u. In this section, we assume that the supplier
declares beforehand that he/shewould share a fraction (t1, t2) of the
expenditures for services and promotional effort, respectively. The
parameters b(0), (g 0) and d(0) measure the responsiveness of
market demand to its own price and service level and promotional
activity, respectively. The randomvariable x describes the base-case
potential market size for the product that follows p.d.f. f(x), i.e.,Z ∞
0
f ðxÞdx ¼ 1. The expected proﬁt functions of the supplier and
the retailer are as follows.
E1½SðQ ; p; s;uÞ ¼ ðw cÞQ  ðv1  v2ÞEðA xÞþ 
1
2
t1ms
2
 t2nu2
(2)
and
E2½RðQ ; p; s;uÞ ¼ pðm bpþ gsÞ wQ þ v1EðA xÞþ
 rEðx AÞþ  1
2
ð1 t1Þms2  ð1 t2Þnu2;
(3)
where
A ¼ ðQ þ bp g s duÞ; (4)
EðA xÞþ ¼
ZA
0
ðA xÞf ðxÞdx; (5)
Eðx AÞþ ¼
Z∞
A
ðx AÞf ðxÞdx (6)
and
FðAÞ ¼
ZA
0
f ðxÞdx: (7)
Now, our main objective is to determine the optimal values of
the EOQ, the sales prices, the service level and the promotional
effort such that the chain's proﬁt is maximized. The main objective
of our model is to maximize the proﬁts of the chain as well as the
proﬁts of the individual members of the chain. We shall study the
decision mechanism under the following scenarios:
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In the centralized model of this system, both the supplier and
the retailer make decisions after consulting each other. Then, the
prime objective of the members of the chain is to maximize the
integrated expected proﬁt of the system. Therefore, the expected
proﬁt of the chain, combining Eqs. (2) and (3), is
EIP ¼ E1þ E2 ¼ pðm bpþ gsÞ  cQ þ v2EðA xÞþ
 rEðx AÞþ1=2ms2  nu2
(8)
Now, differentiating EIP with respect to Q,p,s and u, we have
vEIP
vQ
¼ ðr  cÞ  ðr  v2 ÞFðAÞ; (9)
vEIP
vp
¼ ðm 2bpþ g sþ duþ brÞ  ðr  v2ÞbFðAÞ; (10)
vEIP
vs
¼ ðgpms rgÞ þ ðr  v2ÞgFðAÞ; (11)
vEIP
vu
¼ ðdp 2nu rdÞ þ ðr  v2ÞdFðAÞ; (12)
v2EIP
vQ2
¼ ðr  v2 Þf ðAÞ<0; ∀ r> v2; (13)
v2EIP
vp2
¼ 2b ðr  v2Þb2f ðAÞ<0; ∀ r> v2; (14)
v2EIP
vs2
¼ m ðr  v2Þg2f ðAÞ<0; ∀ r> v2; (15)
v2EIP
vu2
¼ 2n ðr  v2Þd2f ðAÞ<0;∀ r> v2; (16)H ¼
0
BB@
ðr  v2Þf ðAÞ ðr  v2Þbf ðAÞ
ðr  v2Þbf ðAÞ 2b ðr  v2Þb2f ðAÞ
ðr  v2Þgf ðAÞ ðr  v2Þdf ðAÞ
gþ ðr  v2Þbgf ðAÞ dþ ðr  v2Þbdf ðAÞ
ðr  v2Þgf ðAÞ gþ ðr  v2Þbgf ðAÞ
ðr  v2Þdf ðAÞ dþ ðr  v2Þbdf ðAÞ
m ðr  v2Þg2f ðAÞ ðr  v2Þgdf ðAÞ
ðr  v2Þgdf ðAÞ 2n ðr  v2Þd2f ðAÞ
1
CCAv2EIP
vQvp
¼ v
2EIP
vpvQ
¼ ðr  v2Þbf ðAÞ<0;∀ r> v2; (17)
v2EIP
vQvs
¼ v
2EIP
vsvQ
¼ ðr  v2Þgf ðAÞ>0; ∀ r> v2; (18)
v2EIP
vQvu
¼ v
2EIP
vuvQ
¼ ðr  v2Þdf ðAÞ>0; ∀ r> v2; (19)
v2EIP
vpvs
¼ v
2EIP
vsvp
¼ gþ ðr  v2Þbgf ðAÞ>0; ∀ r> v2; (20)v2EIP
vpvu
¼ v
2EIP
vuvp
¼ dþ ðr  v2Þbdf ðAÞ>0;∀ r> v2; (21)
v2EIP
vsvu
¼ v
2EIP
vuvs
¼ ðr  v2Þgdf ðAÞ<0;∀ r> v2: (22)
For the maximum value of EIP, Eqs. (9)e(12) are individually
zero. Then, solving Eqs. (9)e(12), we have the stationary points as
follows
u* ¼ mdðm cbÞ
4bmn 2ng2  gdm ; (23)
s* ¼ 2ngu
md
; (24)
p* ¼ 1
d
ð2nuþ cdÞ; (25)
Q* ¼ bp* þ gs* þ du* þ F1

r  c
r  v2

: (26)
The associated Hessian matrix is given by
H ¼
0
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
v2EIP
vQ2
v2EIP
vQvp
v2EIP
vQvp
v2EIP
vp2
v2EIP
vQvs
v2EIP
vQvu
v2EIP
vpvs
v2EIP
vpvu
v2EIP
vQvs
v2EIP
vpvs
v2EIP
vQvu
v2EIP
vpvu
v2EIP
vs2
v2EIP
vsvu
v2EIP
vsvu
v2EIP
vu2
1
CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
Substituting the above second-order partial derivatives, the
Hessian matrix isTo check the nature of the Hessian matrix, we must show that
the matrix must be deﬁnitely negative for concavity of the EIP, i.e.,
the eigenvalues of the matrix are all negative real numbers.
Case-II: Partial Decentralized Supply Chain (DCS)
In this case, the supplier determines the optimal values of Q,s
and u, and the retailer determines the optimal value of p. Now,
differentiating E1 partially with respect to Q,s,u, and E2 with
respect to p, we have
vE1
vQ
¼ ðw cÞ  ðv1  v2ÞFðAÞ; (27)
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vs
¼ mt1sþ ðv1  v2ÞgFðAÞ; (28)
vE1
vu
¼ 2nt2uþ ðv1  v2ÞdFðAÞ; (29)
vE2
vp
¼ ðm 2bpþ g sþ duþ brÞ  ðr  v1ÞbFðAÞ: (30)
Equating Eqs. (27)e(30) to zero and solving these, we have the
optimal values of (Q,p,s,u) as follows:
u* ¼ dðw cÞ
2nt2
; (31)
s* ¼ gðw cÞ
mt1
; (32)
p* ¼ 1
2b
(
mþ g
2ðw cÞ
mt1
þ d
2ðw cÞ
2nt2
þ rb ðw cÞðr  v1Þb
v1  v2
)
;
(33)
Q* ¼ bp* þ gs* þ du* þ F1

w c
v1  v2

: (34)
Here, the Hessian matrix of E1 isH ¼
0
@ðv1  v2Þf ðAÞ ðv1  v2Þgf ðAÞ ðv1  v2Þdf ðAÞðv1  v2Þdf ðAÞ mt1  ðv1  v2Þg2f ðAÞ ðv1  v2Þgdf ðAÞ
ðv1  v2Þdf ðAÞ ðv1  v2Þgdf ðAÞ 2nt2  ðv1  v2Þd2f ðAÞ
1
Aand the second derivative of E2 with respect to p is
v2E2
vp2
¼ 2b ðr  v1Þb2f ðAÞ<0;∀ r> v1: (35)
Here, the proﬁt function E1 would be concave if the Hessian
matrixH at the above stationery point is deﬁnitely negative, i.e., the
eigenvalues of the matrix are all negative real numbers.
Case-III: DCS when the Retailer is the decision maker
In this case, the supplier is the follower of the decisions made by
the retailer. Then, the retailers optimize their respective lot sizes
and sales prices, service levels and promotional efforts, remem-
bering their own proﬁt. Then, the partial derivatives of E2 are
vE2
vQ
¼ ðr wÞ  ðr  v1ÞFðAÞ; (36)
vE2
vp
¼ ðm 2bpþ g sþ duþ brÞ  ðr  v1ÞbFðAÞ; (37)
vE2
vs
¼ ðgpmð1 t1Þs rgÞ þ ðr  v1ÞgFðAÞ; (38)vE2
vu
¼ ðdp 2nð1 t2Þu rdÞ þ ðr  v1ÞdFðAÞ; (39)
v2E2
vQ2
¼ ðr  v1Þf ðAÞ<0;∀ r> v1; (40)
v2E2
vp2
¼ 2b ðr  v1Þb2f ðAÞ<0;∀ r> v1; (41)
v2E2
vs2
¼ mð1 t1Þ  ðr  v1Þg2f ðAÞ<0;∀ r> v1; (42)
v2E2
vu2
¼ 2nð1 t2Þ  ðr  v1Þd2f ðAÞ<0;∀ r> v1; (43)
v2E2
vQvp
¼ v
2EIP
vpvQ
¼ ðr  v1Þbf ðAÞ<0;∀ r> v1; (44)
v2E2
vQvs
¼ v
2EIP
vsvQ
¼ ðr  v1Þgf ðAÞ>0;∀ r> v1; (45)
v2E2
vQvu
¼ v
2EIP
vuvQ
¼ ðr  v1Þdf ðAÞ>0;∀ r> v1; (46)v2E2
vpvs
¼ v
2EIP
vsvp
¼ gþ ðr  v1Þbgf ðAÞ>0; ∀r> v1; (47)
v2E2
vpvu
¼ v
2EIP
vuvp
¼ dþ ðr  v1Þbdf ðAÞ>0;∀ r> v1; (48)
v2E2
vsvu
¼ v
2EIP
vuvs
¼ ðr  v1Þgdf ðAÞ<0;∀ r> v1: (49)
Equating Eqs. (36)e(39) to zero and solving these, we have the
optimal solution as follows:
u* ¼ mdðmwbÞ
4bmnð1 t2Þ  d2m 2ng
2
ð1t1Þ
 ; (50)
s* ¼ 2ngð1 t2Þu
*
mdð1 t1Þ
; (51)
p* ¼ 1
d

rdþ 2nð1 t2Þu*  ðr wÞd

; (52)
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
r w
r  v1

: (53)
Now, the Hessian matrix of E2 isH ¼
0
BB@
 ðr  v1 Þf ðAÞ  ðr  v1Þbf ðAÞ
 ðr  v1Þbf ðAÞ 2b ðr  v1Þb2f ðAÞ
ðr  v1Þgf ðAÞ ðr  v1Þdf ðAÞ
gþ ðr  v1Þbgf ðAÞ dþ ðr  v1Þbdf ðAÞ
ðr  v1Þgf ðAÞ gþ ðr  v1Þbgf ðAÞ
ðr  v1Þdf ðAÞ dþ ðr  v1Þbdf ðAÞ
mð1 t1Þ  ðr  v1Þg2f ðAÞ ðr  v2Þgdf ðAÞ
ðr  v1Þgdf ðAÞ 2nð1 t2Þ  ðr  v1Þd2f ðAÞ
1
CCAThe above optimal value of (u*,s*,p*,Q*) provides maximum
proﬁt of E2 if the above Hessian matrix is deﬁnitely negative, i.e.,
the eigenvalues of the matrix at the optimal values of the decision
variables are all negative real numbers.
Case-IV: Proﬁt sharing in the integrated system
In this situation, the integrated proﬁt EIP is distributed accord-
ing to the investments of the channel members in the business.
Then, the required proﬁt of the supplier and the retailer are as
follows:
E1** ¼ EIP*

Invested cost of the supplier
Total cost of the whole system

(54)
and
E2** ¼ EIP*

Invested cost of the retailer
Total cost of the whole system

(55)4. Numerical example
We consider the distribution function of x as follows:
ff ðxÞ ¼ a0 þ a1xþ a2x2;∀0  x  Mg, where a1 ¼ 3M3 ð10m2 þ 10s2
þ3M2  12mMÞ, a2 ¼ 12M4 ð15m2 þ 15s2 þ 3M2  16mMÞ, a3 ¼
30
M5 ð6m2 þ 6s2 þM2  6mMÞ and m and s are the mean and the
standard deviation of f(x), respectively. The values of the other key
parameters are as follows: M ¼ 100, m ¼ 50, s ¼ 10, b ¼ 0.70,
g ¼ 0.45, d ¼ 0.35,w¼ 50, v1 ¼ 40, v2 ¼ 30, r ¼ 55, c ¼ 35,m ¼ 0.45,
n ¼ 0.23, t1 ¼ 1/2 and t2 ¼ 1/4. Then, the optimal solutions for
different cases are shown in Table 1. In Table 1, it is observed that
the integrated system is the best strategy for the members of the
chain; the integrated proﬁt is distributed according to their in-
vestment in the business. In the integrated system, the optimal
solution is (u* ¼ 28.36, s* ¼ 37.30, p* ¼ 72.30, Q* ¼ 41.10) and the
costs of the supplier and the retailer invested in the joint venture
are 2253.30 and 2374.25, respectively. Now, the expected proﬁts of
the supplier and the retailer are 262.20 and 275.66, respectively.Table 1
Optimal solution in different cases.
Scenarios Optimal values of variables
u*($) s*($) p*($) Q*(units) E1*($) E2*($) EIP*($)
Case-I 28.38 37.30 72.30 41.10 262.20 275.66 537.86
Case-II 45.65 30.00 73.02 68.25 406.68 197.99 208.69
Case-III 105.00 207.00 153.50 64.40 4511.16 701.86 3809.30The proﬁt function EIP is concave at the optimal values of the de-
cision variables because the eigenvalues (2.11374,
0.456307, 0.387495, 0.170715) are all negative real numbers.5. Conclusion
We have studied the management problems related to an eco-
nomic order quantity, a promotional effort and a service level in a
supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer, assuming
uncertainty in the market demand. Managing uncertainty has
become increasingly challenging over time. Here, the demand of
the customers is inﬂuenced by both price and advertising expen-
ditures as well as sales service efforts. In the proposed model, the
relation between price and demand has a relatively general form
compared with the classic linear relation. We have also considered
centralized and decentralized systems. Ultimately, comparative
study among all of the different approaches has been performed,
and the results reﬂect the signiﬁcant effect in the demand-price
function and may provide a set of optimal values of decision vari-
ables and supply chain members' proﬁt. The practical aspects of our
proposed model include addressing the advertising and sales ser-
vice saturation effect in demand function modelling and different
channel structures (cooperation and the case of a dominant
member). The results show that the proﬁt of the supply chain
achieves its highest value when the chain members cooperate, i.e.,
they conduct business in collaboration.
The proposed model can be extended immediately considering
supply disruption because of transportation problems and the
availability of the products in the market. Conversely, we have
developed the model for continuous variables, which is the main
limitation of our model. This limitation can be waived by consid-
ering the proposed model for discrete types of decision variables.
Moreover, this research can be extended directly by considering a
three-level supply chain (a retailer, a manufacturer and a supplier)
or multi-supplier situations instead of one or more uncertainties
such as the selling price and the supplier's lead time uncertainties.
Another possibility is to study the model by evaluating other forms
of contracts such as a revenue sharing contract or any other new
ﬂexibility contract instead of using a buy-back contract.References
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